By Farhan Bokhari, Daniel Dombey and James Lamont
The motto of the Pakistani army explains much. It reads: "Imaan, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabilillah" or "Faith, Piety, Holy War in the path of Allah."
Where in many parts of the world a regimental motto might sit gathering dust on the silverware of an officers' mess, these few words for Pakistan's army reflect a highly contemporary dedication to the cause of Islam.
In that cause, Pakistan's generals have built close links with Islamic groups, both political and militant. Those links helped create a network of Islamist militants in Afghanistan and Indian- administered Kashmir to fight a proxy war in Pakistan's interest.
Islamist militants and their "jihad" have been accorded the status of vital strategic assets by Pakistan's rulers.
But terrorist attacks well beyond Pakistan's border regions have drawn strong condemnation for these links. Pressure was applied after the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks on the US. Now once again, the ties are under scrutiny after last month's devastating strike on Mumbai, for which India holds the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba militant group to blame.
"The use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy is no longer acceptable. There are no good or bad terrorists," Manmohan Singh, India's prime minister, told the Indian parliament earlier this week. His words were plainly directed at Pakistan.
The US has weighed in behind India. Pakistan "had to act since their territory had been used for these non-state actors to make those attacks", said Condoleezza Rice, the US secretary of state.
Pakistan's military now faces the dilemma of fighting the same Islamist groups that it helped to create. Western analysts believe some elements in the army - most particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence agency - retain loyalties with militants. But General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani, the army's chief, is determined to give a new direction to the military, away from Islamist hardliners.
This transformation is crucial to Pakistan's statehood. The army is the country's strongest institution, created when the country won independence in 1947. It numbers 619,000 personnel and has about 528,000 men in reserve. Moreover, it has considerable political clout, having ruled the country directly for more than half of its 61- year existence.
The Pakistan army was designed as a territorial force with a defensive position against India. That changed when Pakistan's support for the "war on terror" pushed the army into a new combat role against Islamist militants belonging to al-Qaeda and the Taliban along the Afghan border.
This week's arrest of three militant leaders and the banning of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, a charity linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, could mark a break with jihad. Pakistan took into custody Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, a commander of the Lashkar-e-Taiba; Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, its leader; and Masood Azhar, an Islamic cleric blamed for the 2001 attack on India's parliament.
The Bush administration has described this week's detentions as positive moves, but has warned Pakistan to take more than just "one-off" measures.
Some analysts believe the Mumbai attacks and Pakistan's threat to global security has armed Asif Ali Zardari, its president, with a reason to order a clampdown on jihadi groups.
"Inaction is not an option for Pakistan any longer. As you can see, there is so much trouble all around that the government has to order strong action," says Abida Hussain, a leader of the ruling Pakistan People's party (PPP).
Others are deeply sceptical. They worry that Pakistan's commitment is weak and Mr Zardari "a non-entity".
They fear the army will only make "revolving-door arrests" where militants are freed almost as soon as they are captured. "Sustaining this effort is all about wiping out these groups. You have to close down all of their offices, take into custody all of their main members and stop the funding, including funding from outside the country," says Iqbal Haider, a leading human rights lawyer and former minister.
One diplomat described India as in the worst possible position as it tried to bring the Mumbai attackers to justice. He explained that the Pakistani army was the only institutional power in the land, and that to undermine it brought the nuclear armed country only a step closer to being a failed state.
Leverage lay solely with the US, which was hobbled in its response because it needed the co-operation of the Pakistani army to stabilise Afghanistan, he said.
[Disclaimer: A selection of articles from international media are atteched for information and use. The views expressed therein are of the author's alone.]
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